I’ve found cause to tweak the Atlantic’s literary editor Benjamin Schwarz in these pages, but this month he’s in fine form. His “Editor’s Choice” is Among the Dead Cities by A. C. Grayling, a philosopher’s meditation on the ethics of the air war during WWII. “This book will vex and outrage many readers (as it did when it was first published in Britain earlier this year), for many wrong reasons and for a few right ones,” Schwarz begins. The essay that follows is typically thorough in its judgment of Grayling and in its treatment of this thorny & fascinating debate.
At one point, Schwarz singles out Paul Fussell’s Wartime as “among the most cynical and astute books ever written about the conflict”—which, I admit, led me to pump a fist. It’s nice to hear one of your own judgments validated by a critic as severe as this one. Which led me to pull Fussell’s memoir, Doing Battle, off the shelf. I’d been thinking about Fussell already after debating intervention in Darfur with Dan Green. Among the questions implicit in such a back-and-forth include whether the means of war can ever justify its ends. In the case of “Little Boy” and “Fat Man,” the ends were reduced to just that: ending the war. Schwarz points out that in the final days of the Second World War “finesse and accuracy yielded to a grisly slog, the only goal of which was to finish the job regardless of the cost to the opposing side.”
That, anyway, was all that was on the minds of G.I.s who anticipated invading Japan. Fussell remembers the anxiety well:
The way we dealt with the coming hell of further and doubtless much more savage fighting was to ignore its inexorable approach and to solace ourselves with images of the great times (meaning drink and sex) we were going to enjoy on our magical thirty days. I think none of us had the courage to face openly the grave unlikelihood of our survival. Instead, we repressed it below consciousness, where it festered and broke out in nameless angers, quarrels, and fistfights. We spent the hot days of early August bitching, eating, and sleeping. Informed as we were about events on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, we knew the Japanese war couldn’t possibly end until we personally ended it with our artillery, mortars, rifles, bayonets, machine guns, and now, flamethrowers.
One day, the normal babble of the camp rises in volume and assumes recognizable forms. “Hot shit!” “Jesus Christ!” “Is it true?” “God damn!” “Holy Jesus!” Unbelievable, such a dramatic reprieve. Equally unbelievable, the news a few days later of a second magical bomb. Then, the negotiations about the Emperor’s remaining in place. Finally, the fantastic news about the Jap surrender. Was it a dream? A hoax? There must be a catch. But no, we had won the war. We infantrymen were not going to be killed after all. We were going to see our girls and wives, our parents and children, brothers and sisters again, and live among them happily forever. The sudden reversal of expectation was too much for me to handle phlegmatically. I was simply speechless, and idea-less as well. The night of the day that brought the news of the total surrender, I repaired to my tent to rejoice in silence and darkness. I avoided talking to anyone, lest I burst into tears in public.
That phrase “magical bomb” sticks with me every time I read that passage. The darker side of that magic comes from Hiroshima, the hauntingly understated essay that John Hersey originally published in The New Yorker and then in book form in 1946.
Then a tremendous flash of light cut across the sky. Mr. Tanimoto has a distinct recollection that it traveled from east to west, from the city toward the hills. It seemed a sheet of sun. Both he and Mr. Matsuo reacted in terror—and both had time to react (for they were 3,500 yards, or two miles, from the center of the explosion). Mr. Matsuo dashed up the front steps into the house and dived among the bedrolls and buried himself there. Mr. Tanimoto took four or five steps and threw himself between two big rocks in the garden. He bellied up very hard against one of them. As his face was against the stone, he did not see what happened. He felt a sudden pressure, and then splinters and pieces of board and fragments of tile fell on him. He heard no roar. (Almost no one in Hiroshima recalls hearing any noise of the bomb. But a fisherman in his sampan on the Inland Sea near Tsuzu, the man with whom Mr. Tanimoto’s mother-in-law and sister-in-law were living, saw the flash and heard a tremendous explosion; he was nearly twenty miles from Hiroshima, but the thunder was greater than when the B-29s hit Iwakuni, only five miles away.)
When he dared, Mr. Tanimoto raised his head and saw that the rayon man’s house had collapsed. He thought a bomb had fallen directly on it. Such clouds of dust had risen that there was a sort of twilight around. In panic, not thinking for the moment of Mr. Matsuo under the ruins, he dashed out into the street. He noticed as he ran that the concrete wall of the estate had fallen over—toward the house rather than away from it. In the street, the first thing he saw was a squad of soldiers who had been burrowing into the hillside opposite, making one of the thousands of dugouts in which the Japanese apparently intended to resist invasion, hill by hill, life for life; the soldiers were coming out of the hole, where they should have been safe, and blood was running from their heads, chests, and backs. They were silent and dazed.
Under what seemed to be a local dust cloud, the day grew darker and darker.
The debate, of course, has raged for 60 years, although it has occurred mostly in the halls of academe. Lately, something like a discussion has broken out in Germany, spurred by the posthumous publication a few years ago of the essay “Air War and Literature” by German novelist W. G. Sebald. In it, he challenged the German literary community to confront the awesome wreckage left in the wake of Allied “dumb” bombing. Sebald’s argument—that Germans’ obsession with their collective guilt has obscured the reality of their simultaneous victimhood—can be neatly turned around: Americans’ obsession with their collective good (cue Stephen E. Ambrose, Tom Brokaw, Band of Brothers) has obscured the reality of their simultaneous evil.
Years after the war, Fussell published “Thank God for the Atom Bomb” in The New Republic, an essay that drew many angry responses. Fussell was interested in attacking what he considered to be high-minded rhetoric like this from J. Glenn Gray, author of The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (1959): “The combat soldier knew better than did Americans at home what those bombs meant in suffering and injustice. The man of conscience realized intuitively that the vast majority of Japanese in both cities were no more, if no less guilty of the war than were his own parents, sisters, or brothers.”
Fussell called such hand-wringing “cant.”
The future intellectual historian who will write The History of American Canting in the Twentieth Century will find much to study and interpret in the utterances of those who dilate on the special wickedness of the A-bomb droppers. Such a position can perform for the speaker a valuable double function. First, it can display the fineness of his moral weave. And second, by implication it can also inform the audience that during the war he was not so socially unfortunate as to find himself down there with the ground forces, where he might have had to compromise the purity and clarity of his moral system in the interest of survival. Down there, which is where you find the people you and I don’t normally know (just as we probably don’t know anyone who was killed in Vietnam), down there is the place where coarse self-interest is the rule. When the hysterical young enemy soldier comes running toward you with wild eyes, firing, do you shoot him in the foot, hoping he’ll be hurt badly enough to drop or misaim the gun he’s going to kill you with, or do you shoot him in the chest (or if you’re a prime shot, in the head) to make sure that you, not he, will survive that mortal moment?
When talking about Darfur, Dan Green argued that more reliable arguments in favor of war are made by veterans or those who show themselves willing to serve. [Ed: See comments.] It seems to me that a willingness to serve, to face that moment when “the hysterical young enemy soldier comes running toward you with wild eyes” is in itself unreliable. Such a willingness could no longer have anything to do with purity and clarity, with politics or geopolitical goals.
Which is why we’re still stuck—civilians like you & me, on the left & right & in the center—debating war and making terrible decisions the consequences of which, in the end, we thankfully know nothing.
IMAGE: A-24 aircraft assigned to the 3rd Bomb Group during World War II (Elmendorf Air Force Base)